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FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES. By .Doug-
las A. Kahn and Lawrence W. Waggoner. Boston: Little, Brown. 
1977. Pp. xvii, 848. $21.95. 
From the vast repertoire of anthems sung by the consumer choirs 
in the age of Nader, legal educators have heard the often loud, some-
times clear, usually dissonant chorus of law students lamenting the 
nature and quality of their legal education.1 To the conservative ear, 
some of the calls for change, such as that for a two-year law school 
program,2 have a radical tenor. Law schools tend to change slowly, 
however, and most students would probably oppose a true revolu-
tion in legal education. Nonetheless, major changes in the content 
and methods of legal education have occurred. Law schools have 
increased the number of clinical and interdisciplinary programs, of-
fered courses in new subjects, instituted smaller classes, and tried 
new approaches to old subjects ( e.g., legal ethics) and basic skills 
(e.g., research and writing). I will not try to evaluate these devel-
opments here, but I do sense some worthy achievements and ap-
plaud vigorously those institutions experimenting in legal education. 
Unfortunately the inclination to change rarely extends to that 
staple of legal education, the well-subscribed, standard-subject 
course. Whatever the merits of the developments listed above, many 
law school faculties may have used them merely to appease a deeper 
dissatisfaction. Many faculty members support clinical education, 
for instance, to bolster the morale of second- or third-year students 
who are bored with standard legal materials that emphasize legal 
analysis and parade substantive rules. 3 Many students believe that 
much of what they learn will benefit them directly only because it 
helps them pass their courses. Beyond that, it may give them a head 
start on the bar review and fitfully be useful in practice. Part of the 
problem may arise from an unrealistic notion about the pace of a 
lawyer's professional development.4 Legal educators should stress 
that such development proceeds slowly, is hard to measure, and con-
tinues long after graduation. 
Nevertheless, there are reforms that will genuinely and directly 
meet the legitimate criticisms of the law school curriculum. Teachers 
can change their teaching methods, use more kinds of materials, em-
l. Like most forms of music, these contemporary anthems have antecedents. One writer 
has noted that student complaints about the third-year program were heard at Harvard as 
early as 1935. Stolz, 'I7re Two-Year Law School· 'I7re JJay the Music JJied, 25 J. LEGAL Eouc. 
37, 41 (1971). 
2. Stolz supplies a partial bibliography. Id at 39. 
3. For a study of contemporary student attitudes toward their legal education, see Car-
rington & Conley, 'I7re Alienation of Law Students, 15 MICH. L. REV. 887 (1977). 
4. A similar observation was recently made of the general attitude of students regarding 
career planning. Goodman, 'I7re Anxiety Syndrome, Washington Post, March 14, 1978, at 17, 
col. I. 
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phasize some neglected legal skills, and show how related subjects 
interact. The scant attention given these matters is especially regret-
table since student discontent flows largely from their experience in. 
the staple courses. 
At one time, many law students argued that law schools focused 
on what the legal rules are but not what they should be if we are to 
progress toward a just society. More recently, a preoccupation with 
their careers seems to have blunted that criticism. Indeed, I have ob-
served at several law schools that most students respond to serious 
discussions of policy with vacant stares. Perhaps they fear any diver-
sion from the "tell me what the law is" approach, which they con-
sider essential to their immediate professional development. 
Nevertheless, I disagree with those who wish to expand the coverage 
of traditional, broad policy issues. Specific policy questions should 
be raised. For example, the merits of special tax treatment of capital 
gains income is a good classroom topic, but it can hardly be covered 
extensively in an introductory course in federal income taxation.5 On 
the other hand, tax students who deal with the conflict between fair-
ness and the need for objective, workable rules should learn about 
the benefits of administrative c9nvenience, for the taxpayer and the 
government, in the content and 'implementation of basic tax rules. A 
better understanding of this problem among lawyers would reduce 
unnecessary tax litigation; that understanding should not be dis-
missed as a matter to be learned in practice. 
Although after Watergate few students need to be made more 
cynical about vested interests and the legal process, the dynamics of 
the legislative 1process and its potential for special-interest laws 
should.be probed.6 Introducing law students to the social and moral 
complexities of legislation does as much to improve the integrity of 
the federal tax system as urging a deeper concern for equity by prac-
ticing specialists and their professional associations. Examining the 
realities of tax legislation may also alleviate student concerns about 
overly abstract education. 7 
5. The scope of the subject is illustrated by Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains 
Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957). 
6. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 
CASES & MATERIALS 390 (1972), raises the suspicion that the old§ 166(t) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, relating to preferred treatment of certain bad debts, was designed to meet 
the needs ofa particular taxpayer. Not until the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 
605(a), 90 Stat. 1575, was this special rule repealed. 
7. Additionally, such an inquiry may illustrate the devious ways in which narrow statutory 
language can be used to implement special interests. For example, in 1966 Congress finally 
amended the old§ 2056(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit an increase in the 
marital deduction through a disclaimer by a person other than the decedent's surviving spouse, 
Act of Oct. 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-621, 80 Stat. 872. Although§ l(b) applies the amendment to 
estates of decedents dying after enactment, § l(c) reaches back to include certain prior dis-
claimers by reference to an estate tax return filing date occurring on or after January 1, 1965. 
Since the estate tax returns at that time were not due until fifteen months after death, the 
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Law schools are beginning to respond better to the call for in-
struction in professional responsibility, but the subject has usually 
been confined to single courses. These courses have been plagued by 
the difficulty of securing enthusiastic and long-term commitments 
from full-time faculty members, who fear a professional dead end; 
uninterested students, who see no relationship to "real" law; and the 
scarcity of modem teaching materials. I do not insist that such 
courses be abandoned, but that professional responsibility issues 
should more often be incorporated into substantive courses. Students 
may better appreciate the complexity of ethical problems that are 
presented as part of a substantive legal analysis. Furthermore, in-
structors experienced in a particular field can best identify the im-
portant problems and the uncertain line between the ethical and the 
expedient. 
Scheduling and personnel demands inevitably divide the law 
school curriculum into courses imperfectly aligned with the practice 
of law. That fragmentation serves pedagogical purposes, particularly 
in the first year. However, the traditional second- and third-year cur-
riculum may perpetuate unrealistic dividing lines. The ability to in-
terweave principles from different areas of the law, or from different 
branches of a single area lies at the core of a successful legal career. 
Thus, the second- and third-year curriculum should stress analysis 
that embraces more than one traditional subject, and instructors 
should learn to teach that kind of analysis. Yet one can hardly expect 
revolution in the face of tradition, established specializations, and 
the fragmented state of teaching materials. 
Some integration of substantive areas has occurred, but peculiar 
deficiencies persist. Federal estate and gift tax courses, for instance, 
generally ignore or skim the formidable income-tax rules that influ-
ence the planning of inter vivos gifts. For more than ten years, I have 
taught my federal estate and gift tax students the relevant income-
tax rules, particularly by comparing the estate and gift tax provisions 
with the income tax provisions for incomplete lifetime gifts. Needless 
to say, I do not claim to have invented this scheme, but I am struck 
by the persistence of the old ways. 
A broader integration of property and tax materials in an estate 
planning course raises serious issues on which reasonable people 
committed to innovation in legal education will disagree. An inte-
grated property and estate tax planning course might overwhelm stu-
dents who have had no prior exposure to the area. Although 
attractive because of its practical and "real life" appearance, the 
course might demand too much knowledge of basic property and tax 
special provision could grant a marital deduction to the estate of a decedent who died during 
1963. The provision does not openly favor a small class of taxpayers, but one may speculate 
that it benefited a limited number of taxpayers. 
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rules. Whether the property-tax integration should be reserved for 
advanced courses or seminars in estate planning seems to me an 
open question, but so little has been attempted in the large basic 
courses that property-tax teachers should be anxious to experiment. 8 
With tradition and inertia, the perennial shortage of time mili-
tates against integration. Surely an estate and gift tax course with 
substantial income tax coverage needs three hours rather than two. 
Moreover, the potential benefits of an integrated estate and gift tax 
course so impress me that I would sacrifice some "pure" estate and 
gift tax material to achieve it; a broad perspective far outweighs the 
harm of exploring fewer nooks and crannies in the substantive law. I 
am prepared to defend that idea to students whose curricular deci-
sions are unduly influenced by the content of bar examinations. I 
would also delete from the basic income-tax course all but a general 
introduction to income taxation of trusts and estates,9 prune the 
course from four hours to three, 10 and reduce the number of hours 
now offered in trusts, estates and future interests courses. 11 I recog-
nize that these suggestions present problems for my colleagues in tax 
and property, but these colleagues may be placated by the compen-
sating advantages of my proposals. 
Questions remain about teaching methods. I am uninterested in 
joining the traditional debate over the merits of the case 
method,12 problem approach and the combinations thereof. More ba-
sic questions must be confronted before legal materials can be se-
lected for a course. I share the view of some teachers and, I sense, 
some thoughtful students, that second- and third-year courses focus 
too narrowly ori litigation. That the American lawyer's training be-
gins with a law school curriculum devoted to the analysis of court 
opinions certainly helps explain Americans' litigiousness.13 No one, 
of course, suggests locking the casebooks in a back room of the law 
library. The attitude and approach of the instructor, not just the 
materials he uses, are at issue. Law school courses traditionally give 
too little time to legal planning, to asking how to draft a document or 
8. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 1978), 
though otherwise devoted to the nontax aspects of wealth transmission, contains a chapter on 
estate and gift tax provisions. 
9. I have used with general satisfaction J. FREELAND, s. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDA• 
MENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1977). I have regu-
larly deleted, however, the detailed materials on income taxation of trusts and estates (at 304-
21). 
10. From my limited experience in teaching a four-hour basic income tax course, I sense 
an inevitable pressure to fill the latter part of the course with specific materials of limited 
benefit to most law students. 
11. Trusts and estates instructors will disagree as to whether to prune the basic wills and 
trusts rules or the more complicated but sometimes exotic future interests problems. 
12. For a contemporary defense of the case method, see Dente, A Century of Case Method: 
An Apologia, 50 WASH. L. REV. 93 (1974). 
13. See generallj'Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 17. 
January 1978] Recent Books 561 
statute to eliminate problems in advance. Classroom materials can 
facilitate either the planning or litigation approach; those who favor 
substantial use of problems as the basis for class discussion easily 
resist the overemphasis on litigation. 
The focus on litigation in most courses may not foreclose, but 
does discourage, classroom consideration of other important skills. 
Students need to learn to collect and distill accurately the informa-
tion needed to plan safely a transaction or to draft plainly a statute 
or regulation; to evaluate proposed transactions, statutes, and regula-
tions from the perspectives of those affected; and to negotiate trans-
actions and dispute settlements. Courses studying private 
transactions and their governmental regulation or taxation most 
clearly invite teaching these skills. Since the bulk of most practice, 
whether in a large or small city, in a firm or a government agency, 
involves private transactions regulated by the government, these 
skills deserve more attention than the neglect they receive in law 
schools. 
Some have suggested that these skills are best developed after 
graduation.14 But why should skills so important to success in the 
profession not be nurtured as early as possible? Notwithstanding the 
size of the staple classes, an instructor with the right materials can 
convey the broad range of the lawyer's tasks. 
No doubt a broader approach requires sacrificing some of what 
we now teach. The alternative, extending law school beyond three 
years, is infeasible given the cost of legal education and the discon-
tent of students. As I remarked above, I would reduce the coverage 
of substantive law. Students retain much of the detail in courses only 
long enough to take the examination. Furthermore, a properly 
trained law student has the basic analytical skills and the acquain-
tance with legal materials to fill the gaps in course work. Indeed, I 
suspect that law teachers in good schools underestimate the speed 
with which students grasp the skills taught in the staple courses. If a 
beginning lawyer is prudent and supervised, there should be no in-
crease in professional incompetence. 
Finally, teachers' and practitioners' complaints about law stu-
dents' research and writing ability have little to do with course con-
tent and perspective. Writing deficiencies stem from fundamental 
problems in our educational system and almost certainly will not be 
corrected in the large staple class. Similarly, complaints about the 
research of beginning lawyers simply reflect the likelihood that only 
law review and moot court participants will have done any research 
after the freshman year. 
14. E.g., Gorman, Proposals far Reform of Legal Education, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 847 
~~ . 
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This lengthy discussion of legal education was stimulated by a 
major new book, Kahn and Waggoner's Federal Taxation of Gifts, 
Trusts and Estates. The authors have integrated the study of federal 
transfer15 and income tax provisions relevant to the gratuitous trans-
mission of wealth. Indeed, among contemporary volumes, 16 the 
Kahn and Waggoner book has the most integrated approach to the 
subject. In the preface the authors comment: 
[W]e have tried to integrate the material functionally, so that the in-
come, estate, gift and generation-skipping tax consequences of a partic-
u1ar transaction are considered together. This not only enables us to 
look at the materials in the way a practicing lawyer must approach 
planning problems [reviewer's exclamation: hallelujah], but it also fa-
cilitates a more sophisticated probe of the underlying policies, or lack 
thereof, of our tax system as a whole. We do not, however, attempt to 
integrate an in-depth study of property law.17 
For reasons discussed previously, I have no quarrel with the exclu-
sion of property law, 18 and enough property law is integrated where 
necessary for a broader perspective or for an understanding of spe-
cific tax problems. 
A quick survey of the book reveals the authors' integrative tech-
nique. Part I ( chapters 2-7) includes the income tax basis rules for 
property acquired from a decedent in its discussion of the basic es-
tate tax rules for property owned by the decedent at his death and 
for property over which he has a power of appointment. Tax instruc-
tors will immediately detect an overlap with the traditional basic in-
come tax course, but some repetition in the law school curriculum is 
hardly a major fault, particularly in a subject made so complex by 
the recent enactment of carryover basis rules for property acquired 
15. The phrase "federal transfer tax" will increasingly be used as a shorthand for three 
federal taxes applicable to gratuitous transfers: gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfers. 
16. The collaborators on THE STUDY OF FEDERAL TAX LAW: EsTATE AND GIFT TAX VOL• 
UME (1977-1978) have finally added a chapter dealing with income taxation of trusts and es-
tates. See also B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION (4th 
ed. 1972). I find classroom use of the gigantic A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (3d ed. 1961 & 
Supp. 1977) difficult. Less problematic is A. CASNER & R. STEIN, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER 
THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1976 (2d ed. 1978), a volume apparently prepared for use in contin-
uing legal education. 
Other recent books have retained isolated considerations of federal transfer taxes, e.g., S. 
SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXA• 
TION, CASES AND MATERIALS (1977). Professor David C. Johnson rather comfortably ignores 
that fact in Book Review, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 470. The isolated treatment of the transfer taxes 
may be partially explained by the structure of the nonclassroom material. E.g., R. KRAMER & 
J. McCORD, PROBLEMS FOR FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (1976), which is designed for 
use with their text, C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT 
TAXES (3d ed. 1974). 
17. D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF GIFTS, TRUSTS AND EsTATES xvi 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as KAHN & WAGGONER]. 
18. See text at note 8 supra. 
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from a decedent. 19 Moreover, the repetition allows the students to 
reconsider basic income tax rules in an estate planning context. 
Part II ( chapters 8-9) introduces the student to income taxation of 
trusts and estates, including the infamous throwback rules for distri-
butions of accumulated trust income. Again, the basic income tax 
course may be duplicated to some extent.20 I prefer to delete all but 
an introduction to this subject from the basic course. Unlike the in-
come tax basis rules, which apply to a variety of transactions outside 
the estate planning area, these highly specialized and complex rules 
apply only to the income taxation of trusts and estates. Thus as long 
as students are introduced to the taxpayer entity subject in the basic 
income tax course, those who do not take the estate and gift tax 
course are unlikely to suffer from not having learned those trusts and 
estates rules in law school. 
The most dramatic example of the book's integrated approach is 
to be found in Part III (chapters 10-17). Entitled "Inter Vivos Trans-
fers," it is divided into three parts: (1) gift rules; (2) estate and in-
come tax provisions applicable to lifetime gifts; and (3) federal 
taxation rules for jointly held property and significant special assets 
such as life insurance, annuities, and employee death benefits.21 
Kahn and Waggoner's book may also help tax instructors answer 
some of the other criticisms of law school curriculum. Chapter 1, for 
example, includes ample and challenging materials on the policies 
underlying the basic transfer tax22 and the new generation-skipping 
transfer tax, though the reproduction of the entire House Ways and 
Means Committee Report on the latter provisions seems excessive.23 
Legislative materials and professional association reports on policy 
issues in more specific areas are included througho-g.t the book.24 The 
failure of the government and the courts to develop a workable pol-
icy regarding an estate tax deduction for selling expenses incurred by 
the executor is illustrated clearly but repetitively.25 
19. The authors are to be congratulated on their effective incorporation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, which was enacted when they had already reached a very late stage in the prepa-
ration of their book. 
20. See text at note 9 supra. 
21. The authors raise the issue of the gratuitousness of property transfers for federal gift 
and estate tax purposes at appropriate points. See, e.g., the basic gift tax materials, KAHN & 
WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 399-428. The separate treatment of the consideration subject in 
Chapter 14 is of doubtful value. 
22. See, e.g., id. at 12-15. 
23. Id. at 160-78. It is doubtful that many students can profit from this item, but, in fair-
ness to the authors, all the instructors in this area are still searching for an appropriate ap-
proach to this major new subject. 
24. E.g., id. at 431-43, on the annual gift tax exclusion, and 407-09, on the new disclaimer 
rules. 
25. Id. at 190-98. 
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Kahn and Waggoner integrate ethical issues through a recent 
California case holding an attorney liable for a tax planning mis-
take26 and through some bar association opinions regarding solicita-
tion of estate planning business. They also explore the draftsman's 
protection under a "savings clause" designed to assure qualification 
for complex and error-prone areas such as the marital deduction.27 
One of the more difficult practical problems facing the tax practi-
tioner is the proper response to the question whether to disclose on 
tax returns items which the lawyer considers not taxable but which 
he knows that the government might consider taxable. An exercise in 
drafting language for a "rider" to a return might be added by an 
instructor. 
Those primarily concerned with estate planning might find that 
this book shares the traditional casebook's preoccupation with liti-
gated transactions. Some planning discussions and exercises are in-
cluded,28 but as I previously noted, the breadth of a course's 
perspective depends as much on the instructor as on the book. An 
instructor concerned with estate planning should be able to alert stu-
dents to the planning problems inherent in even traditional materi-
als. This book does not include a large, summary problem that 
invites the student to draft a complete estate plan.29 I suspect the 
authors consider such exercises best developed by instructors for 
their advanced course or seminar.30 
Most teachers will need to be selective in their use of the book. 
The authors admit the difficulty of covering the entire book in a 
three semester-hour course.3I A syllabus that prunes the course to 
manageable proportions could relieve students of excessive detail.32 
Indeed, some of the book is probably too detailed even for an ad-
vanced course. For example, I consider it essential to cover the si-
multaneous death problem in the marital deduction context. The 
basic problem is difficult enough, however, and applying it in the 
context of tenancy by the entirety as well may hinder, more than aid, 
26. In the Teachers' Manual at 1, the authors openly discourage coverage of the malprac-
tice case in class. Although the nontax principles in the California case are self-evident, class-
room discussion may insure that students give at least some attention to an issue of growing 
importance to practitioners in the estate planning area. 
27. KAHN & WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 275-78. 
28. E.g., id. at 305-07, on marital deductions and 196-97, on executors' selling expenses. 
29. See generally A. CASNER, supra note 16. 
30. Neither do the authors devote any attention to the professional skills of interviewing, 
counselling, and negotiations. The difficulty of fact-gathering could have been illustrated in 
the Chapter 2 discussion of valuation, for instance, by including one or two cases rich in facts 
pertinent to the valuation of real estate or closely held stock. 
A more direct approach to the development of these skills is taken in N. STEUBEN & W, 
TURNIER, PROBLEMS IN THE TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 
(1978). 
31. KAHN & WAGGONER, supra note 17, at xv. 
32. Each author reprints his own syllabus in the Teachers' Manual at 211-16. 
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the student. 33 
On the other hand, most teachers will prefer too much to too 
little. Indeed, because of the abundance of materials, 34 this book can 
be used in advanced as well as beginning courses in estate planning, 
and even in the basic course detailed items may appeal to some. Few 
recipients of a general power of appointment, for example, are later 
disabled by mental incapacity, 35 but the situation presents an inter-
esting conceptual problem. Importantly, the authors analyze that 
problem from the perspective of the estate planner. 
Furthermore, I applaud the book's diversity; the authors include 
not only cases and rulings, but legislative materials, professional as-
sociation reports, and excerpts from the IRS Audit Technique Hand-
book for Estate Tax Examiners.36 A separate volume compiles 
portions of the Internal Revenue Code, treasury regulations, and cer-
tain uniform property laws. That volume will be useful to students 
and practitioners alike. 
The book's format fails to differentiate adequately cases, 
problems, and the authors' textual discussion through titles or ty-
pography. The book's homogeneous appearance, which complicates 
reading, may be part of the authors' design of "a highly structured 
course . . . which assigns equal weight to cases, hypotheticals, and 
planning and policy questions."37 This worthy goal, I fear, may be 
defeated by the students' tendency to read selectively, particularly in 
a book with such an abundance of materials. And as does that abun-
dance of materials, the book's physical appearance suggests the im-
portance of a detailed syllabus. Nevertheless, any author will admire 
the book's general technical qualities and freedom from typographi-
cal errors. 
I am pleased to endorse a book that advances a broad perspective 
of tax instruction without sacrificing substantive content. Those who 
share some of the views expressed earlier in this review will also be 
grateful to the authors for assisting the movement toward that vision 
of legal education. 
John L. Peschel 
Professor of Law 
New York University 
33. KAHN & WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 228-30. The problem is made especially diffi-
cult by the authors' postponement until Chapter 15 of a detailed treatment of joint tenancy 
property for estate tax purposes. 
34. For a "leaner'' but quite satisfactory basic income tax book, see note 9 supra. 
35. KAHN & WAGGONER, supra note 17, at pp. 132-35. In their Teachers' Manual at 25-
25b, the authors report some reconsideration of this subject in Estate of Gilchrist, 69 T.C. 5 
(1977). 
36. KAHN & WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 49-50. 
37. Id. at xvi. 
